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Introduction to a Panel on the
Modernization of Financial
Regulation: What Is the
Governmental Role in Finance,
Anyway?
by David G. Oedel*
On January 8, 1998, at the annual meeting of the Association of
American Law Schools, a program sponsored by the Section on Financial
Institutions and Consumer Financial Services was held, "What Is the
Governmental Role in Finance, Anyway?" Three distinguished panelists
made presentations outlining core concerns that the panelists argued
should guide future governmental regulation of banking and finance.
The following papers are based on the panelists' presentations at the
conference and offer insights into the thinking of some of the most
prominent figures in financial regulation today.
The papers are evidence of the rich mix in financial regulation of the
theoretical and the practical, the historical and the futuristic, the
political and the economic, the bureaucratic and the entrepreneurial--an
eclectic array of forces that all line up to be counted in the legal calculus.
The papers also implicitly acknowledge the general social importance of
finance, as well as the sheer difficulty of any attempts to adjust the
systematic character of financial regulation.
John D. Hawke, Jr., Under Secretary of the Treasury for Domestic
Finance, offers some fascinating reflections on his ongoing efforts to help
shape the future of financial regulation. Secretary Hawke is widely
acknowledged as the point man in President Clinton's administration on
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the modernization of financial regulation. He has been credited with
facilitating an ongoing political conversation into significant financial
services reform, and in particular was thought by many insiders to have
played a key role in shepherding the various parties unexpectedly close
to financial regulation reform legislation in 1997.
It was on the heels of the stalling of financial regulation reform
legislation in the closing weeks of 1997 that Secretary Hawke made the
presentation to law professors that is memorialized here. In his
remarks, however, Secretary Hawke remained cautiously optimistic
about the prospects for enactment of legislation reforming financial
regulation--and at least by this writing on May 18, 1998, Secretary
Hawke's cautious optimism appears to have been well grounded. On
May 14, 1998, the House of Representatives barely passed-but did
finally pass-the House's primary financial regulation reform bill, H.R.
10, by a vote of 214-213.' Senate action is now pending, but it remains
uncertain.
Ironically, the Treasury Department, which has consistently pushed
financial regulation reform legislation for years, extending back even
into the Bush and Reagan administrations, is at this particular juncture
reportedly balking (that is, threatening to recommend a veto) because of
one aspect of the pending reform legislation-consolidation of more
regulatory authority in the Federal Reserve at the expense of the
Treasury Department and its Comptroller of the Currency.' We will
await what may yet prove to be just another of the labyrinthine twists
in the road to financial regulation reform.
As a historical matter at least, as well as for a glimpse into the more
distant future of financial regulation, Secretary Hawke's remarks at the
annual meeting of law professors are worth careful study.
One insightful theme that Secretary Hawke advances and defends is
the dismantling of key barriers between banking and commerce-a
theme that seems unlikely to be fully achieved in the near future, but
a project that Secretary Hawke warns banks to avoid at their competitive peril as commercial firms use unitary thrift holding companies to
blast their way into the financial marketplace.
Another theme that Secretary Hawke explores is the political dynamic,
that is, who will support what reform and why. His demonstrated
sensitivity to the elaborate intertwinedment of economics and politics
helps make him simultaneously a candidate for the premier American

1. Leslie Wayne, House Passes Banking Bill By One Vote, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1998,
at C1, col. 5.
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banking lawyer and the premier American banking regulator today.
Indeed, the two fields are difficult to separate.
Secretary Hawke also offers insights into why financial regulation has
not been reformed despite massive efforts by regulators, legislators, and
academics (he suggests that the primary aversion to reform is based on
fear of competitive encroachment), into why the tide is turning (gradual
regulatory erosion of legal barriers between activities, plus consumer
impatience with artificial market segmenting), and into the future for
functional rather than institutional regulation (prospects for functional
regulation look good but still entail answering many difficult questions
of how to define functional activities).
Thomas M. Hoenig, an economist, President of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City since 1991, and a member of the interest rate
setting Federal Open Market Committee, provides another enlightening
perspective on financial reform from the vantage point of a consummate
regulatory insider.
Mr. Hoenig has been surprising banking audiences for several years
with his unsentimental views of the logic of bank regulation,' generally
arguing for narrower bank regulation as a theoretical matter of sound
public policy. His present paper, however, focuses more practically on
the question of how the modernization of financial regulation (especially
including expansions of bank power) might affect the regulatory "safety
net," and in particular, access to federal deposit insurance.
In the present context, Mr. Hoenig is less concerned with narrowing
the scope of financial regulation than he is with ensuring that the safety
net is not expanded along with bank powers, thereby exacerbating latent
problems of moral hazard (that is, "games" in which the rule is, "Heads
I win; tails you lose.").
Mr. Hoenig's pragmatic caution in the present circumstances of fast
moving financial regulation reform, combined with his theoretical
honesty about the limited justifiability of the safety net, make him, like
Jerry Hawke, an intriguing, courageous, complex, and thoughtful leader
in the world of American financial regulation.
Michael Taylor graciously flew in from England to speak on this panel,
helping to illustrate and illuminate the annual meeting's over arching
theme of globalization. Professor Taylor, who formerly served with the
Bank of England in a regulatory capacity, is now Reader in Financial

3. See, e.g., Thomas M. Hoenig, Bank Regulation: Asking the Right Questions,
ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY (First Quarter, 1997),
at 5 (arguing for a narrow bank regulation system, primarily oriented around protection
of the payments system).
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Regulation at the ISMA Centre for Education and Research in Securities
Markets at the University of Reading.
After emerging from his life as a regulator, Professor Taylor proposed
a provocative new model of financial regulation in the United Kingdom,
the so-called "Twin Peaks" model in which wholesale and retail banking
matters would be regulated separately.
More recently, in the wake of the Blair administration's call for a
single super-regulator, Professor Taylor has again acted with a freethinking critique in which he questions the value of "reform" in the guise
of a regulatory leviathan.4
In his current paper given at the annual meeting of the Association of
American Law Schools, by contrast, Professor Taylor takes a very broad,
less pointed, essentially comparative view of financial regulatory reform,
arguing that many similarities at least exist between the ongoing
evolution of all the financial regulatory systems in the developed
economies.
In short, Professor Taylor makes the case that the "old" and in some
ways still prevailing paradigm of financial services regulation no longer
lines up with economic, political, and regulatory realities. The old
objective of stability in financial matters has been overcome by the
emergence of competition as an important good to be nurtured by
lawmakers and regulators. Meanwhile, the traditional institutional
regulatory control mechanisms have become confused as the lines
between institutions and markets have become blurry. Even the tools
that the regulators have traditionally used to supervise their regulatees
no longer seem to work precisely or well.
Professor Taylor argues that the obsolescence of the old regulatory
paradigm is attributable to essential changes in the nature of the
financial services industry itself. With geographic barriers being lifted,
competition now occurring between different types of institutions for
similar products and customers, large scale conglomerization proceeding
apace, and markets becoming integrated from the consumer's perspective
at least, the traditional regulatory paradigm is simply no longer
meaningful.
Professor Taylor suggests that all developed nations are now in the
hunt for a new regulatory paradigm that cannot wholly be satisfied
simply with greater disclosure and more self-regulation by market
participants.
If indeed we are, as Professor Taylor suggests, living somewhere near
the crossroads of financial regulation history, then these panelists are

4. MICHAEL TAYLOR, REGULATORY LEVIATHAN:
Wren, 1997).
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very promising guides on that uncertain future course. I hope you will
enjoy their provocative thoughts on financial regulation as much as
those of us who were fortunate enough to attend the annual meeting of
the Association of American Law Schools and this program sponsored by
the Section on Financial Institutions and Consumer Financial Services.

